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The medical malpractice "crisis" of the mid-1970s produced signifi-
cant changes in the health care system nationwide. Physicians and hos-
pitals faced skyrocketing malpractice insurance rates.' Many
experienced difficulty procuring coverage2 because insurers could no
longer bear the risks of carrying medical malpractice insurance.3 The
dramatic increase in the number of malpractice claims4 filed and the
I. Between 1960 and 1970, premiums for dentists rose 115%, for hospitals 262.7%, for physi-
cians 540.8%, and for surgeons 949.2%. A surgeon paying 1.2% of gross income in 1964 for profes-
sional liability insurance paid 4.2% in 1970. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13
(1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
Premiums for physicians in California rose 500% from 1974 to 1976. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF
AUDITOR GENERAL: THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS IN CALIFORNIA (December
1975). See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CONDI-
TIONS (July 11, 1975); Comment, Michigan's MedicalMalpractice Legislation-Prognosis: Curable
Defects, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 309 (1978).
2. Doctors in "high risk" specialties, such as surgeons and anesthesiologists, faced complete
cancellation of their policies. Solimine, Ohio's Rxfor the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient
Pays, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 90, 90 (1976).
Reduced availability of malpractice insurance for physicians and hospitals "led to a general
increase in the cost of medical care and a decrease in the availability of medical services in some
areas." Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Timefor a Model Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454,
454-55 (1981). See also HeintzArbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims." IsIt Cost Effective? 36
MD. L. REV. 533 (1977).
3. In Michigan, only one carrier writing physician insurance continued doing so after June
1, 1975. Shelby Mutual, which insured 20% of the physician market, and Argonaut Insurance Co.,
which wrote 25% of the hospital liability policies, pulled out of the market completely after June 1,
1975. R. LERNER, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, MEMORANDUM: THE MICHIGAN MALPRAC-
TICE ARBITRATION PLAN (May 10, 1975) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter cited as LER-
NER MEMORANDUM]. See also Siedel, Malpractice Reform in Michigan, 1976 DET. C.L. REV. 235,
236.
For a comprehensive statistical analysis of the insurance crisis between 1960-1972, see U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE: APPENDIX 494 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW APPENDIX].
4. See HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. See generally Heintz, MedicalMalpractice Arbitra-
tion A Successful Hospital-BasedApplication, 680 INS. L.J. 515 (1979); Jones, MedicalMalpractice
Litigatiorn Alternativesfor Pennsylvania, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 407 (1981); Nocas, Arbitration f Medi-
cal Malpractice Claims, 13 FORUM 254 (1977); Note, The Impact of Arbitration on Medical Mal-
practice: Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 10 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 613 (1977).
One student author deemed the increase in medical malpractice claims a "legal rights explo-
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size of jury awards5 significantly contributed to these escalating insur-
ance rates. To protect themselves from possible litigation, doctors
practice "defensive medicine ' 6 by performing unnecessary or extra
procedures, contributing to the cost and maldistribution of health care
resources. Increasing dissatisfaction with the inefficiencies associated
with the traditional litigation process, such as delays in getting to trial,
inability of lay jurors to comprehend technical medical testimony, and
excessive jury awards,7 caused several state legislatures to sanction an
sion." Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-.A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655,
658 (1976).
5. In April 1975, the White House Conference on malpractice found that the average jury
verdict in 1974 rose to $103,000, up 60% from 1973 and up 200% from 1969. LERNER MEMORAN-
DUM, supra note 3, at 3.
6. HEW Secretary Caspar Weinburger estimated that "defensive medicine" cost the public
up to $8 billion in 1974. LERNER MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 1. As much as $1.4 billion of
this total was on unnecessary X-rays alone. INSURANCE COMM'N, MICH. DEP'T OF COMM, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE IN MICHIGAN: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN 2 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MICHIGAN]. Examples of "defensive medicine"
include:
I. excessive utilization of X-ray and routine diagnostic procedures;
2. excessive utilization of laboratory tests;
3. additional office visits to follow-up medical conditions which might give rise to
complications;
4. excessive utilization of medical consultations;
5. more instances of hospitalization for borderline cases which might be treated as well
at home;
6. extended hospitalization of patients following surgery to avoid the possibility of pre-
mature discharge and possible complications at home.
Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in HEW APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 39.
The threat of litigation may also make doctors more reluctant or unwilling "to treat patients
suffering from afflictions which require treatments or risky procedures that carry a low rate of
success." MICH. H.R. LEGIs. ANALYSIS SECTION, SPECIAL ANALYSIS 2 (April 1975).
A comprehensive study of the practice of defensive medicine revealed three kinds of defensive
medicine:
1. Positive defensive medicine----"is the conducting of a test or performance of a diag-
nostic or therapeutic procedure which is not medically justified but is carried out primar-
ily (if not solely) to prevent or defend against the threat of medical-legal liability."
2. Negative defensive medicine-"occurs when a physician does not perform a proce-
dure or conduct a test because of the physician's fear of a later malpractice suit, even
though the patient is likely to benefit from the test or procedure in question."
3. Reluctance to publish adverse consequences injournals--"describing in detail noted
adverse effects of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. The fear is that the material
will be picked up and used as evidence in a lawsuit."
HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. See also Project: The Medical Malpractice Threat: Study of
Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939; Comment, supra note I, at 309.
7. The jury system is often criticized forits inability to resolve medical malpractice disputes.
Many claim that the jury is unable to deal with complex medical facts and experts and that juries
are vulnerable to emotional appeals by the plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney. See, e.g., Cohn, Medl.
calMalpractice Litigation: A Plague on Both Houses, 52 A.M.A.J. 32, 33 (1966). Others claim that
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alternative dispute resolution forum for medical malpractice claims:
Arbitration. 8
Presently, twelve states9 and Puerto Rico1° have statutes specifically
providing for binding arbitration of medical malpractice disputes. In
arbitration, disputants agree"I to submit their claim for settlement to an
independent panel 2 in lieu of a full-scale trial. Because arbitration
was historically faster and less costly than litigation,' 3 the state legisla-
tures believed it would help hold down the cost of insurance and in-
crease its availability to health care providers.'
4
In their haste to promote arbitration, these states may deprive the
a jury will overcompensate a plaintiff with visible injuries and undercompensate a plaintiff with
little visible damage. LERNER MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 2. See also Lash, Arbitration of
Medical Malpractice Disputes as a Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Panacea or Pan-
dora's Box for Insurers, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 102, 102 (1979).
Moreover, the delays and expenses associated with litigation present special problems for the
parties. Because it is so expensive to go to court, many insurance companies may feel the pressure
to settle, thereby creating a "file and settle syndrome." Plaintiff's lawyers may be reluctant to take
small claims which may not adequately provide compensation for time and effort spent. HEW
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
8. Arbitration is defined as: "The reference of a dispute to an impartial (third) person cho-
sen by the parties to the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator's award issued
after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 96 (5th ed. 1979).
9. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1981); CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 1295 (Deering 1981), GA. CODE ANN. § 7-402 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, 201
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2701 (Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1
(1977 & Supp. 1982). North Dakota recently repealed its arbitration statute, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-29.1 repealed by 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 358 §1.
10. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 4110 (Supp. 1980).
11. See infra notes 158-214 and accompanying text for a discussion on the validity of such
agreements.
12. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutionality of
these panels.
13. "[Alrbitration as an alternative procedure. . . would expedite the processing of meretori-
ous claims and reduce the emotional and financial stresses on claimants, the courts, and the medi-
cal profession and its insurance carriers." Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of
Agreements to Arbitrate MedicalMapractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 947 (1972). See generally Fried-
man, Arbitration in Medical Malpractice, 13 TRIAL 49 (August 1977); Nocas, supra note 4; Com-
ment, supra note 4.
14. The delays associated with litigation may be partially responsible for extremely high and
erratic malpractice insurance rates because insurers are less able to accurately project claims
losses. See infra note 23-35 and accompanying text. For a statistical analysis of the ability of
arbitration plans to expedite claim closures, see infra notes 228-51 and accompanying text.
Another commentator suggests the contrary: "[Arbitration] actually may cause an increase [in
claim frequency], and a subsequent overall increase in the cost of handling claims since its rela-
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patient of valuable rights, including the constitutional right to a jury
trial 5 and the ability to receive adequate compensation for injuries.
The belief that the patient entered into the arbitration agreement vol-
untarily may only be illusory. 16  Consequently, a patient may sign
away valuable rights at a time, and in a setting, when least able to eval-
uate the wisdom of selecting arbitration for malpractice claims.
Part I of this Note will examine the cause and effects of the malprac-
tice "crisis" which led these state legislatures to adopt arbitration as an
alternative to litigation. Part II will analyze the present state statutes,
and Part III will critique the deficiencies present in these statutes. Part
IV will evaluate the efficacy of malpractice arbitration to determine
whether it is achieving its goals, and will suggest the implementation of
statutory safeguards. The author contends that in responding to the
financial difficulties of the insurance companies, doctors, and hospitals,
state legislatures have inadequately provided protection for the rights
of patients.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE OF THE "CRISIS"
Several factors have contributed to the rapid increase in malpractice
claims in the last few decades. First, greater sophistication in medical
technology engenders greater risks.17 The increased risks not only ex-
pose the patient to more danger and uncertainty of success, but also
may raise the patient's expectations beyond the efficacy of the medical
procedure. 8 Heightened consumerism, moreover, has made patients
tively speedier process may encourage claims which the slowness of the litigation system may have
discouraged otherwise." Lash, supra note 7, at 104.
Michigan's Malpractice Arbitration Act, which took effect Sept. 1, 1975, purports "to enable
insurers to more accurately project losses, [and] it is the belief of its sponsors that this legislation
will expedite the settlement and resolution of claims and reduce or stabilize malpractice insurance
costs." Desenberg, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: The New Michigan Statute, 54 MICH. ST. B.J.
536, 536 (1975). See also Note, Medical Malpractice-A Question oflnsurablity, 80 DICK. L. REv.
594, 596 (1976) (regarding similar legislative goals in the Pennsylvania legislation).
15. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNo, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377 (1978); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568 (1978).
16. See infra notes 158-214 and accompanying text.
17. "[A]fter World War II . . . many more people were able to afford, and received [sic]
medical care ... [s]ome of the new diagnostic and therapeutic procedures brought with them new
risks of injury; as the potency of drugs increased, so did the potential hazards of using them."
HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. See also Chapman,, New Malpractice Crisis?, 8 LEo. As PEcTs
MED. PRAc. 24, 26 (1980); Comment, supra note 4, at 655.
18. "Lacking an appreciation of the complexities and hazards of modem medical practice,
many patients undervalued the inherent risks and assumed negligent conduct when the final out-
[Vol. 61:123
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more aware of their rights,'9 thereby fostering additional malpractice
claims.
Second, specialization and depersonalization of the medical field has
eroded the doctor-patient relationship.20 The development of the medi-
cal specialist and team care has created a less intimate physician-pa-
tient relationship. This may result in more distrust and
misunderstandings between patients and their physicians. 2' Unfamil-
iar surroundings and personnel may overwhelm, and place at a distinct
disadvantage, the patient seeking medical services, whether from a pri-
vate physician, clinic, or hospital emergency room. Patients in the
medical care setting want to believe that the medical staff will compe-
tently relieve their distress. A patient's inability, however, to develop a
come was less than had been expected." HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. Another author com-
mented that "medical technology, though highly sophisticated, has yet to overcome all untoward
effects of drugs and surgical procedures." Comment, supra note 4, at 655. See also 1 D. LOUISELL
& H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 11.01 (1981).
19. The mass media has been criticized as creating "unrealistic expectations about medicine's
abilities" through expanded coverage of the latest technological and medical "miracles." HEW
REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
One study of the impact of the mass media, particularly of newspaper coverage, on medical
malpractice concluded, however, that "despite isolated instances of emotionalism, bias, and inac-
curacy, press, radio, and television coverage of medical malpractice cases is, on the whole,
straight-forward, factual, and balanced." HEW APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 653. See also Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 310.
20. Comment, supra note 4, at 655. Dr. Ronald E. Gots, Director of the National Medical
Advisory Service, argued that the poor relationship persists years after the malpractice crisis. "We
still have the same social problems, an expanded medical technology, the dissociation between
doctors and patient, and a sense of alienation on the part of the patients." Chapman, supra note
17, at 26.
21. HEW REPORT, supra note I, at 3. One physician commentator blamed the medical field
for this "patient alienation," which is caused by doctors growing less sensitive to the patients'
needs and the increase in the number of foreign doctors. Bachman, Doctors: Move Closer to Your
Patient, II TRIAL 25, 25 (May-June 1975).
The shortage of doctors in this country may also affect the quality of health care.
Most physicians are inundated with more patients than they can handle. As a result,
medical practice has lost much of the leisurely grace and personal warmth that it once
had; and, physicians out of necessity have had to develop their practices into more of a
commercial enterprise than a humanitarian experience.
Wecht, Medicine: .4 Commercial Enterprise, 11 TRIAL 39, 39 (MAY-JUNE 1975). See also Chap-
man, supra note 17, at 26; Kessel, The.4. M..4. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 267 (1970).
One commentator suggested that the breakdown in doctor-patient relations may only be a re-
sult, and not a cause, of the malpractice crisis. Instead, he proposed that "the root cause of the
current malpractice problem is the substantial number of injuries and other adverse results sus-
tained by patients during the course of hospital and medical treatment." Bernzweig, Getting to the
Root of the Problem, 11 TRIAL 58, 59 (May-June 1975).
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rapport with his physician, "coupled with the frustration of having no
effective channel for complaint," 22 may lead to the filing of a claim in
the event of disappointing results.
The increase in medical malpractice claims caused significant
changes in malpractice insurance. Insurance premiums soared23 and
many health care providers became unable to procure any insurance. 24
Insurers faced high, largely unpredictable risks, 25 extensive administra-
22. Comment, supra note 4, at 655. Creation of a Patient Grievance Mechanism (PGM) to
handle formal complaints of patients may ameliorate the unfamiliarity of the hospital setting. See
Thompson, Lupton, Renck & Feldesman, Patient Grievance Mechanisms in Health Care Institu-
tions, in HEW APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 758.
Moreover, a Patient Service Representative, as suggested by the American Hospital Association,
may improve communication between the medical staff and patient:
As the liaison between patients and the institution, he provides a specific channel
through which patients can seek solutions to problems, concerns, and unmet needs. As
management's representative, he interprets the institution's philosophy, policies, proce-
dures. . . [a]s the patients' advocate, he enables patients and families to obtain solutions
to problems by acting in their behalf with administration....
Id at 760.
23. "The cost of a constant level of medical malpractice insurance coverage increased seven-
fold for physicians, ten-fold for surgeons, and five-fold for hospitals between 1960-1972." MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE IN MICHIGAN, supra note 6, at 1-3. These soaring premiums rates were mir-
rored in every state. See Kendall, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in HEW
APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 494.
Premiums rose more rapidly for physicians in "high-risk" specialties. In New York,
neurosurgeons and orthopedic surgeons paid $14,329 in premiums in 1975, compared to $2225 in
1969. Note, Rxfor New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROnS. 467,
468-69 (1975). Also in New York, hospital malpractice premium rates rose 316% in a two-year
period, from $348 per bed in 1974 to $1,447 per bed in 1976. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE HEALTH NOTEs: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 2 (February 1981).
Between 1960 and 1972, the relative cost of constant level of medical malpractice coverage rose
more rapidly in some areas than others; namely, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Michi-
gan, Nevada, New Jersey, and New York. For example, in California, the average premium for a
surgeon rose in 1972 to 252.2% of the national average. Kendall, supra at 540.
In Michigan, as of 1968, doctors' premiums were 85% of the national average for premiums. In
1972, they rose to 133.8% of the average, and in 1975, the rates were 160% higher than the 1973
rates. Siedel, supra note 3, at 236.
24. A 1974 survey conducted by the Michigan State Medical Society revealed that 5.7% of the
40 % of all Michigan physicians who responded to the survey were refused renewal on their insur-
ance policies, "while 14.8% had been named as codefendants with a hospital in a law suit." Siedel,
supra note 3, at 236. See also Anthony, MSMS Survey Pro vides First Data on Medlcal Malpractice
Situation, 73 MICH. MED. 612 (1974).
25. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MICHIGAN, supra note 6, at 4. Between 1968 and 1974, one
insurer experienced an increase in claims of 139% and an increase in the amount paid to claimants
in settlement or by judgment of 117%. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary
Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489, 490 n.3 (1977).
More recent statistics indicate that this insurance crisis continues. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners reports that between 1976 and 1978, the average payout for malpractice
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/2
Number 1] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
tive costs, and uncertain returns for their efforts. Consequently, many
insurers refused to provide malpractice coverage,26 leaving many
health care providers uninsured. Some physicians sought insurance
from nonlicensed surplus-time companies which accepted higher
risks27 but provided inadequate protection. Many legislatures28 created
insurance funds to uncertain availability of insurance for health care
providers. Doctors threatened slowdowns and strikes29 to "dramatize
the crisis" because many physicians no longer could afford to practice
medicine.3°
Insurance companies also reacted by shifting away from "occur-
claims rose 28%. As of April 1978, the average cost of a closed claim rose to $34,081, up 38% from
1976. Chapman, supra note 17, at 25.
26. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Many insurance companies left the malpractice
liability market, and the arduous task of finding a replacement carrier often resulted in higher
premiums. For example, in 1973 in New York, Employers Insurance of Wausau refused to pro-
vide such coverage after 24 years of service. Argonaut Insurance Company of California agreed
to provide such coverage, but only after a 100% increase in premium rates. Note, upra note 23, at
468.
In Pennsylvania, Argonaut agreed to renew policies for the 25% of the physicians it insured in
that state only upon the condition of a 207% premium increase. Note, Medical Malpractice-4
Question oflnsurability, 80 DICK. L. REV. 594, 594 (1976).
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 134, 339 A.2d 291, 293
(1975), the Maryland court of appeals reversed the trial court in holding that St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. could avoid renewing malpractice insurance in Maryland for 3600 physi-
cians after incurring a deficit of$10 million. See also Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims
Statute.- Maryland's Response to the MedicalMalpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 74,77 (1980).
27. Between 1973 and 1974, Michigan experienced a 40% increase in doctors obtaining insur-
ance in this manner. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MICHIGAN, supra note 6, at 2.
28. The goal of these professional liability insurance funds is to enable health care providers
who are ineligible or unable to procure insurance on their own to obtain insurance at a reasonable
premium. Se' Siedel, supra note 3, at 240.
"Risk-pooling mechanisms, such as joint underwriting associations [JUAs] .... operate as a
safeguard against total cancellation of professional liability coverage by requiring that all liability
insurance carriers in a state join together to supply such coverage at the behest of the insurance
commissioner." Comment, supra note 4, at 661.
See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.46 (West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 548 (1979
& Supp. 1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.125000 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. INS. LAW § 681 (McKinney
Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
29. See Siedel, supra note 3, at 238; Solimine, supra note 2, at 90.
30. The alarming and sudden increases in these malpractice premiums made practicing
medicine prohibitively expensive for some physicians. "Older and part-time physicians have al-
ready indicated that their limited practice does not generate sufficient income to warrant the ex-
pense of malpractice insurance. . . .physicians may leave the state. This migration, coupled with
retirements, would aggravate the present shortage of well-trained physicians." Note, supra note
23, at 469.
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rence" policies toward "claims-made" policies.3' Because an "occur-
rence" policy covers torts during the policy period32 regardless of when
a plaintiff files suit, it provides broad coverage and creates a "long-tail"
effect.33  This delay between the actual tort and the filing of a claim,
however, makes it difficult for the insurer to accurately predict losses,
and thus, future rate schedules.34 A "claims-made" policy, in contrast,
may only cover malpractice claims filed during the policy year, thus
providing narrower coverage3 5 and a lower risk to the insurer.
State legislatures responded swiftly to the crisis, through tort law re-
form, by statutorily limiting the amount of damage awards, 36 and by
31. Note, The "Claims Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 925, 926 (1975). In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barcy, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), Rhode
Island physicians and their patients brought suit against four insurance companies writing mal-
practice in the state, alleging a conspiracy in violation of § 3(b) of the Sherman Act. The claim-
ants alleged that three of the four companies refused to sell insurance to any policyholders as a
means of compelling them to accept "claims-made" policies. The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals in holding that this activity by the insurers constituted a boycott within § 3(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act because it foreclosed all opportunity for coverage in the relevant
market. Id at 553.
32. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barcy, 438 U.S. 531, 553 (1978). "For example, the
physician maintaining occurrence coverage knows that once he retires or ceases to practice, the
policies he purchased in the past will provide him with complete coverage against any future
claims. In contrast, the retired physician who practiced with claims-made insurance must con-
tinue to purchase yearly policies after he ceases treating patients and earning money to pay for
premiums." Abraham, supra note 25, at 493.
33. This "long-tail" may also increase the cost of a claim. For example, a case filed in Janu-
ary 1970 worth $100,000 will cost $156,000 to settle in June 1975. LERNER MEMORANDUM, supra
note 3, at 2.
34. "An 'occurrence' insurer must compute premiums for a professional liability policy at
current rates even though claims may become highly inflated long after the premiums cease to be
paid. . . .premiums received by this insurer may well be inadequate against the inflated claims of
the future." Note, supra note 31, at 928-29.
35. Premiums under "claims-made" policies may be lower as well because insurers do not
have to predict the risk that a claim will be filed after the expiration of the policy. Note, supra
note 31, at 929. A "claims-made" policy also shifts the responsibility of the health care provider to
invest funds to provide for future claims. Abraham, supra note 25, at 493.
One commentator suggested that the skyrocketing premium rates may not have been necessary.
"Insurers were accused of raising premiums to recoup losses on the stock market and of comput-
ing premium rates in unwarranted secrecy." Solimine, supra note 2, at 90.
36. Several states have placed limits on the amount of damages in malpractice actions. See
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2(b) (Deering Supp. 1981) ($250,000 limit on recovery); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4204 (1977) ($150,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (Bums Supp. 1982) ($100,000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(b)(2) (West 1982) ($500,000); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43
(Page 1981) ($200,000); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1977& Supp. 1981) ($750,000). But see ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) (repealed P.A. 81-288, § I eff. Aug. 28, 1979))
The Illinois Supreme Court in Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 II. 2d 313, 347
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eliminating res ipsa loquitur,37 the collateral source rule,38 and ad
damnum 39 clauses. Extra-litigation reforms included encouraging the
use of screening panels' and arbitration4' to resolve disputes.
N.E.2d 736 (1976), held that the statutory limit of $500,000 violated the equal protection clause of
the Illinois Constitution. Id at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 744.
37. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may prove "unfair to the physician as it puts him in the
position of having to prove his freedom from negligence without the plaintiff having to prove that
any negligence occurred." HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
The doctrine applies in cases where foreign objects are left in the body. Plaintiffs, traditionally,
have the burden of proving that the injury: "1) must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence; 2) must be caused by an instrumentality or agency within
the exclusive control of the defendant; 3) must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the plaintiff." D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAmS, supra note 18, at 14.04.
See Abraham, supra note 25, at 499. See also Comment, The ,pplication of.Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 852 (1966).
A few jurisdictions have limited or prohibited the use of res ipsa in medical malpractice cases to
help shift the burden of proof from the defendant-physician. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 41A.100 (1979) (creates rebuttable presumption for foreign body cases, bums, or surgery per-
formed on wrong part of body); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:2 (Supp. 1979) (prohibited);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(c) (1980) (limited application of instrumentality within physician's
control); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1981) (prohibited).
38. The collateral source rule precludes the jury from considering other sources of compensa-
tion in assessing damages, thereby allowing the possibility of double recovery. Redish, Legislative
Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REV.
759, 964 (1977). Although use of the rule prevents penalizing plaintiffs for purchasing their own
protection, it allegedly "inflated awards by forcing a health-care provider to pay for damages for
which an injured patient had already been compensated." Comment, supra note 4, at 669.
States abrogating the collateral source rule include: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.1 (Deering
Supp. 1981); IowA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-471 (Supp.
1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4010 (McKinney 1981); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1301.602 (Purdon Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1981).
39. "Ad damnum clauses have been abandoned because of the belief that statements of spe-
cific sums have had a prejudicial effect on the public, both as prospective plaintiffs and jurors, by
implanting an inflated idea of what claims are worth." Comment, supra note 4, at 670. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 6-5-483 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042 (West Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-9.5-1.6 (Burns Supp. 1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41E (West 1977); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60C (West Supp. 1981); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.42C (Page 1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-117 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.009(1) (West Supp. 1980).
40. Submission of malpractice disputes to a review board or screening panel is designed to
"weed out" nonmeritorious claims, decreasing the present cost of defending such claims. Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 679.
A panel typically consists of three physicians and a nonvoting attorney who serves as chairman.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-I (Bums Supp. 1981). The panel may make a determination of liabil-
ity and appropriate damages. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2602 (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-9.5-9-7(d) (Burns Supp. 1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(G) (West 1977); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
The panel's finding may be admissible into evidence in a subsequent trial de novo. One student
author, however, observed that "the informality and lack of procedural safeguard... may lead to
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a panel conclusion that is unfair to the patient or the health-care provider.... [T]he prejudicial
effect of an admissible, adverse panel report could be virtually impossible to overcome, thus carry-
ing over an unjust panel determination into a judgment. Comment, supra note 4, at 681.
Screening panels have been challenged recently on several grounds: Aldana v. Holub, 381
So.2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (unconstitutional as application of rigid jurisdictions; period is arbitrary and
capricious); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (imper-
missible delegation ofjudicial functions to nonjudicial personnel); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976) (violates state constitutional right to jury
trial).
For a more thorough analysis of the structure and efficacy of these screening panels, see Abra-
ham, supra note 25, at 513; Baird, Munsterman & Stevens,Alternatives to Litigation I. Technical
Analysis, in HEW APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 214; Redish, supra note 38, at 766; Siedel, supra note
3, at 250; Comment, supra note 4, at 679; Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitu-
tionalAnalysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 322 (1977).
For a comparison of various state provisions, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2602 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1001 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (Burns Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4901
(1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1977); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
2A-01 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41A.010 (1980); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.308 (Purdon Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-104 (1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1
(1977 & Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.065 (West 1980 & Supp. 1981).
41. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Many state legislators believed that arbitra-
tion "could expedite the resolution of medical malpractice claims; expedite the expenditure of
time by physicians, lawyers, witnesses and patients; render more realistic and equitable awards
than juries; reduce the costs associated with investigation and case preparation; and provide a
relatively private forum in which to resolve complex cases." Heintz, supra note 2, at 534.
On the federal level, Senator Gaylord Nelson, a member of the Senate Health Subcommittee,
proposed a bill in January 1974 which would provide reinsurance to states that established arbi-
tration programs for medical malpractice claims. The arbitrator's determination would be non-
binding and admissible in a subsequent trial de novo. Nelson, Mushrooming Malpractice, A
Federal Rx, 11 TRIAL 10, 19 (May-June 1975).
The Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice recommended the establishment of state
arbitration statutes so long as the following characteristics are present:
1. Arbitration statutes. . . should be designed to give jurisdiction over all parties...
involved in a specific medical malpractice case.
2. State arbitration laws should set a maximum monetary limit for invoking the juris-
diction, with cases demanding higher amounts being handled through the present
jury system.
3. Arbitration panels should include some persons who are neither attorneys nor per-
sons involved in the delivery of health care services.
4. There should be the right of trial de novo subsequent to arbitration in the highest
level jury court in the State.
5. The State should provide economic and legal sanctions, in order to discourage subse-
quent trials de novo of questionable merit.
HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 93. See generally Gilmore, MedicalMalpractice Arbitration: Insur-
ance Developments, 653 INS. L.J. 366 (1977); Ladimer, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: 1978
Roundup, 1978 INS. L.J. 530; Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis, 62
VA. L. REV. 1285 (1976).
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II. CONTEMPORARY ARBITRATION STATUTES
A. Characteristics of 4rbitration
Arbitration is an ancient forum42 for dispute resolution that provides
an alternative to litigation.43 Critics of the traditional legal system 44
believe that arbitration reduces the time and expense associated with
litigation4 5 by removing technical rules of procedure and evidence,46 by
providing a more informal atmosphere, and by limiting judicial re-
view.47 The use of arbitration is also highly favored in commercial
42. "Some legal scholars have traced arbitration back to 700 B.C. in the Athenian culture.
Indeed, historians who have studied the civilization and culture of the ancient Near East have
found evidence that the Middle Bronze Age society of Babylonia and Sumeria (circa 18th century
B.C.) had a detailed system of arbitration, as set out in the Code of Hammurabi." Ducastel,
Medical Malpractice Arbitration." Fact or Fiction?, 60 MICH. ST. B.J. 940, 940 (1981). See also
Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected Perspectives, 24 ME.
L. REv. 215 (1972).
43. A few early cases recognized the use of arbitration upon the consent of both parties. See,
e.g.. Snyder v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 2d 263, 74 P.2d 782 (1937); Berkovitz v. Arbib &
Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921); Cutler v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195, 25 A. 96 (1892). For
a historical development and analysis of arbitration law in the United States, see F. KELLOR,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948).
44. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. The medical community blames the legal
profession and the contingency fee system for the increase in malpractice suits. Cohn, supra note
7, at 33. Critics argue that the contingent fee arrangement, whereby an attorney recovers a pro-
portion of the client's award in lieu of an hourly fee, "prompt[s] overzealous attorneys to accept
non-meritorious cases and to win high awards from sympathetic juries." Quinn, supra note 26, at
98. See generally Jacobson, Quicksilver-Emotion and Fear, 11 TRIAL 15, 15 (May-June 1975);
Solimine, supra note 2, at 90.
One study reveals that although the contingent fee system may discourage attorney's from ac-
ceptmg cases of minor damage, the differential between the effective hourly rate of plaintiff attor-
neys ($63) and defense attorneys ($50) does not warrant the concern of excessive fees. HEW
REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. In accordance with the Commission's suggestions, id at 34, some
states have established a maximum contingent fee schedule. The Michigan Supreme Court
adopted the following schedule: "not to exceed 40% of the first $5,000 recovered, not to exceed
35% on the next $20,000 recovered, not to exceed 25% on the next $225,000 recovered, not to
exceed 20% on the next $250,000 recovered and not to exceed 10% on any amount recovered over
$500,000." MICH. GEN. CT. R. 928.2(l) (1973).
45. There is strong public policy favoring arbitration because it is "expeditious, inexpensive,
and relieves overburdened courts." Benyon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d
698, 704, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1980). See generally Nocas, supra note 4, at 258; Note, supra
note 26, at 610; Comment, supra note 4, at 682.
46. Some states are reluctant to abrogate formal rules of evidence in arbitration proceedings.
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 7-417 (Supp. 1982) (maintains formal evidence rules) with VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 7003 (Supp. 1982) (abrogates technical rules of procedure).
47. See infra note 273 and accompanying text. For example, the Georgia statute provides
that the findings of the panel are conclusive unless: "(1) the findings were procured by fraud;
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law48 and in labor disputes.49
Parties may either voluntarily elect medical malpractice arbitration °
or have it statutorily imposed.5 To date, only Puerto Rico has
mandatory, binding arbitration requiring the submission of every al-
leged malpractice claim to an arbitration panel52 with limited judicial
review. 3 In contrast, voluntary binding arbitration arises from an
agreement voluntarily and knowingly5 4 entered into between the pa-
tient and the physician or health care provider.5 5 Binding arbitration
(2) there is no evidence to support the findings of fact by the arbitrators; (3) the findings are
contrary to law." GA. CODE ANN. § 7-421 (Supp. 1982).
48. See generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1968). Many states have adopted commercial arbitration statutes modeled after the Uniform
Arbitration Act, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 4 (1978). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-202 (Supp.
1981), in which the purpose of Colorado's Uniform Arbitration Act is to "validate voluntary writ-
ten arbitration agreements, make the arbitration process effective, provide necessary safeguards,
and provide an efficient procedure when judicial assistance is necessary."
For a complete listing of states with modem arbitration acts, see Note, supra note 2, at 459 n.34
(1981).
49. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 44-67 (2d ed.
1973).
Federal policy also supports arbitration in labor disputes. Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
50. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
52. P.R LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 4110 (Supp. 1980).
53. The arbitration decision in Puerto Rico is final and binding on the parties, unless the
court finds that: "(a) the findings of facts included in the decision are clearly erroneous; or (b) the
decision was not rendered in keeping with the law; or (c) the proceedings necessary for rendering
the decision were not carried out." P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 4113(6) (Supp. 1980). Puerto Rico's
requirement of mandatory and binding arbitration may be subject to equal protection challenge
for "singling out a special class of injured persons, those who claim malpractice injuries, for differ-
ent treatment under the law in violation of the 14th amendment equal protection standards."
Comment, supra note 4, at 684.
54. The essence of the "knowing" requirement must be considered in light of the context in
which the signature takes place. The medical surroundings may be unfamiliar to the patient, see
infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text, and may be a coercive atmosphere in which to execute
a legal document, see infra notes 164-205 and accompanying text.
55. This Note will not examine states such as Maryland and Pennsylvania, whose arbitration
statutes, although voluntary, are nonbinding. In Maryland, "[a] party may reject an award for
any reason," MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1980 & Supp. 1982), and seek a trial
de novo of the claim. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, "[aippeals from determinations made by the
arbitration panel shall be a trial de novo in the court," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.509 (Purdon
Supp. 1981).
For an excellent discussion of the Pennsylvania and Maryland arbitration statutes, see Jones,
Medical Malpractice Litigation:A,41ternativesfor Pennsylvania, 19 DuQ. L. REV. 407 (1981); Quinn,
supra note 26.
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precludes a subsequent trial de novo, 5 6 and thus, any opportunity for a
trial by jury.57 A party may enforce an arbitration award as a court
judgment.-8
Under voluntary arbitration statutes, execution of an arbitration
agreement may occur before or after discovery of the claim. These
agreements are labeled preclaim59  and postclaim,6°  respectively.
Health care providers offer a preclaim arbitration agreement prior to
treatment,61 although the consent to arbitration may not constitute a
condition to receiving treatment.62 Consistent with any contract, a
party may invoke against the agreement normal contractual defenses,
such as lack of mutual assent and adhesiveness. 63 To ensure voluntary
acceptance, the statutes typically establish a period of revocation 64 after
56. Ladimer, Statutory Provisionsfor Binding Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 1976
INS. L.J. 405, 406.
57. Comment, supra note 4, at 684. Because binding arbitration precludes the right to a jury
trial, it is essential that the waiver is done knowingly and the patient is fully informed of the
consequences of waiving the right when signing the arbitration agreement in the medical setting.
See infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
58. Ladimer & Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration." Laws, Programs, Cases, 1977 INs.
L.J. 335, 336.
59. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(a) (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (Deer-
ing 1981); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, § 203 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231
(West Supp. 1982); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5041 (Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.22 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12(A) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
Recently, some commentators have criticized the inequities associated with a preclaim agree-
ment. The patient, signing prior to the medical treatment, may not fully appreciate the conse-
quences of the election until after the tortious conduct. See e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at
94.
Consumers Union, authors of the publication Consumers Reports, warned patients against sign-
ing preclaim agreements: "[N]o consumer should waive the right to a jury in advance of potential
injury. But after a mishap has occurred, arbitration may offer a faster route to financial compen-
sation than a lawsuit does." Medical Malpractice: Is the Crisis Over? CONSUMERS REPS., 598, 601
(Oct. 1977).
60. Only three states mandate postclaim agreements. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(a) (1975);
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-403 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp. 1982).
ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS 305 (A. Widiss ed.
1979); Note, supra note 2, at 464 (1981).
61. In Michigan, "a person who receives health care" is offered the agreement, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5041(1) (Supp. 1982), while in Maine, "a person admitted to a health care pro-
vider" is so offered. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(1) (Supp. 1982).
62. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(A) (Page 1981) ("The Agreement shall pro-
vide that medical or hospital care, diagnosis, or treatment will be provided whether or not the
patient signs the agreement to arbitrate.").
63. See infra notes 158-204 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
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execution. Many states provide that some of the agreement's provi-
sions be printed in boldface type.65 The information printed in larger
type may notify the patient that acceptance is not a prerequisite for
treatment,66 or alert him to the jury trial waiver,67 or the revocation
option.68 Only Illinois alerts the patient to all three alternatives.
Three states provide for voluntary, postclaim arbitration.69 After the
alleged claim has arisen, both parties must agree in writing to arbi-
trate.70 A party may enforce the panel's decision as a court judgment,
71
and, in two of the three states, the panel's decision is subject to limited
judicial review.72
B. Persons Bound by Agreement
Many persons other than the patient and treating physician may
enter into an arbitration agreement. Ten state statutes specifically enu-
merate the kinds of health care providers who may enter into such an
agreement. The statute may include hospitals as well as medical doc-
tors, and commonly covers osteopaths, 73 podiatrists,
74 and dentists.75
Under more sweeping provisions, Alaska prescribes arbitration be-
tween patient and "health care provider," 76 and Vermont provides for
65. See infra Appendix A.
66. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 210 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(l)(C) (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5042 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979).
67. See CALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (Deering 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 210
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.24 (Page 1981).
68. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 210 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2702(1)(C) (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5042 (Supp. 1982).
69. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-484 to -488 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-401 to -424 (Supp. 1982); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 7001 to 7008 (Supp. 1982).
70. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(a) (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-403 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp. 1982).
71. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-420 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 7005 (Supp. 1982).
72. ALA. CODE § 6-6-14 (1977) (award final unless arbitrators guilty of fraud, partiality, or
corruption); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-421 (Supp. 1982) (award set aside if fraud present, no evidence to
support findings, or contrary to law); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7005 (Supp. 1982) (award subject to
same appellate review as any civil action).




76. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1981).
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arbitration for "claims based on medical malpractice."77 Similarly,
four of these states78 allow for joinder of unnamed parties-in-interest.79
Joinder may facilitate the resolution of the claim by bringing all the
involved parties into one single proceeding and by preventing the
plaintiff from bringing two actions, one in court and the other in arbi-
tration, against two sets of defendants.80
Presently, in six states,81 a parent or legal guardian can execute an
agreement binding a minor child to arbitration. This removes, contrary
to common law, infancy and lack of capacity as defenses to enforce-
ment of the arbitration agreement.
8 2
In Doyle v. Giuliucci,83 the California Supreme Court held that a fa-
ther may bind a minor by a contract with a medical group. The court
reasoned that the duty to contract for medical care of one's children, "is
implicit in a parent's right and duty to provide for the care of his
child."8 4 The court feared that medical facilities would only reluc-
tantly enter into contracts with minors if minors could disaffirm at ma-
jority.8 5 Thus, the parents' ability to enter into medical contracts
assures that their minor children receive the benefits of medical care.86
Similarly, courts have allowed parents to bind unborn children. In
Lovell v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. ,87 a Michigan trial court held
that a pregnant woman who signed two arbitration agreements, one for
herself, and one for her infant en ventra sa mere, could not contest the
infant's agreement by asserting that the infant was not a minor within
the statute.88 The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to
77. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp. 1981).
78. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 204 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2703(3) (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(4) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-7 (1979).
79. Ladimer, supra note 57, at 408.
80. Nocas, supra note 4, at 255.
81. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(d) (Supp. 1981); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(d) (Deer-
ing 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 207 (Smith-Hurd 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2703(4) (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(2) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-25B-2 (1979).
82. Henderson, supra note 13, at 960. See also 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 6
(1963 & Supp. 1980).
83. 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965).
84. Id at 610, 401 P.2d at 3, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
85. Id
86. Id
87. No. 78-823-624 NM (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 1979).
88. Id at 15. The statute provides: "A minor child shall be bound by a written agreement to
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distinguish between "post and ante partum infants."89  In Troy v.
Leep, 9° however, a Michigan court of appeals held that the same stat-
ute did not compel a woman to arbitrate her claim for the death of her
premature infant. 91 The mother had signed the agreement a day after
the premature birth. The cases are distinguishable, however, because
in Troy the mother never signed an agreement for her unborn infant.
Further, the acts of prenatal care giving rise to the malpractice claim in
Troy did not stem from the health care rendered during the mother's
hospital stay, as required under the statute.92
Currently, seven states9 3 provide for arbitration of the patient's
wrongful death. Courts only reluctantly enforce arbitration of a
wrongful death claim because such a claim actually constitutes a sepa-
rate cause of action vesting in the heirs. Unless the heirs have con-
tracted separately to forego their rights, a court enforcing arbitration
for wrongful death must uphold the questionable proposition that a
decedent has the authority to bind his heirs to arbitration.94 In Rhodes
v. Caliornia Hospital Medical Center,95 however, a California court of
appeals refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate against a husband
and son's wrongful death claim.9 6 Although the admissions form
signed by the decedent wife and mother specifically required arbitra-
arbitrate disputes, controversies, or issues upon the execution of an agreement on his behalf by a
parent or legal guardian. The minor child may not subsequently disaffirm the agreement." MIcH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(2) (Supp. 1982).
89. No. 78-823-624 NM, slip op. at 15 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 1979). In response to plaintiff's
argument that the ability of the parent to bind the child violated the minor's due process rights,
the court in Lovell added: "The law allows a parent, acting in good faith, to compel a child to
have a medical examination, medical treatment, mental hospital confinement, and even surgery,
without the child's consent." Id at 17-18.
90. 101 Mich. App. 425, 300 N.W.2d 598 (1980).
91. Id at 427, 300 N.W.2d at 599.
92. Id
93. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(g)(2) (Deering 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-401 (Supp.
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 202(d) (Smith-Hurd 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (West
Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2701(l) (Supp. 1982); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5040(1) (Supp. 1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B) (Page 1981).
Presumably, Puerto Rico would arbitrate a wrongful death claim because arbitration is
mandatory for "[e]very civil action arising from a malpractice claim." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26,
§ 4110 (Supp. 1981).
94. Note, supra note 48, at 477.
95. 76 Cal. App. 2d 606, 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978).
96. While a patient in defendant-hospital, the decedent leaped to her death from a hospital
window. See Note, California Medical Malpractice Arbitration and Wrongful Death Actions, 51 S.
CAL. L. REv. 401, 426-27 (1978) (suggests amendment to California statute to specifically allow




tion of any wrongful death claim,97 the court held that because the hus-
band and son were not parties to the agreement, it was not binding
upon them. The court reasoned that although public policy favored
arbitration, that policy did not warrant extension of the agreement to
those not directly party to it.98 In contrast, the same court upheld arbi-
tration of a wife's claim for her husband's wrongful death in Hawkins v.
Superior Court.9 9 The court stated that the wife was bound by the arbi-
tration provisions of the health plan in which she and her husband
were enrolled because spouses have an obligation to provide each other
with care and support, including medical care."°
C. Special Considerations in the Emergency Room
The urgencies of a patient's medical needs in the emergency room
setting may substantially diminish the patient's ability to comprehend
the consequences of an arbitration option.' In Ramirez v. Superior
Court,10 2 a Spanish-speaking woman brought her daughter into an
emergency room. A nurse who spoke little Spanish offered her a Span-
ish version of the arbitration agreement, and the mother signed the
agreement, purportedly without reading it. The mother later brought
suit against the physician, alleging negligence in his failure to diagnose
the daughter's meningitis, from which the daughter suffered severe in-
juries.10 3 The appeals court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the mother knowingly and voluntarily signed the agreement,
emphasizing that "the Legislature may not establish a conclusive pre-
sumption that one signing an agreement. . . has in fact consented to
arbitration." 104
97. 76 Cal. App. 3d 606, 608; 143 Cal. Rptr. 59, 60 (1978).
98. Id at 609, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
99. 89 Cal. App. 3d 413, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1979).
100. 1d at 415, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The plan specifically provided for binding arbitration
on account of death.
101. One commentator warns that the medical malpractice arbitration agreement is subject to
more inquiries into contractual mental capacity because the principal contract is for medical at-
tention. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 963.
102. 103 Cal. App. 3d 746, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1980).
103. Id at 750, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
104. Id at 756, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 229. The court criticized § 1295(e) of the statute, which
provides that "[s]uch a contract is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor otherwise
improper.. . . Id See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(e) (Deering 1982). The court interpreted
the provision, "[to permit] a party to seek to show that he or she was coerced into signing or did
not read the many waiver notices provided and did not realize that the agreement was an agree-
ment to arbitrate." 103 Cal. App. 3d at 756; 163 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
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Both Maine and Michigan have specifically addressed the special
problems of the emergency room setting in their statutes. Maine's stat-
ute requires the health care provider to give complete emergency treat-
ment before offering the patient the option of signing an arbitration
agreement. 10 5 Michigan similarly restricts the offer of arbitration. 06
The Michigan arbitration agreement states clearly that the health care
provider may not present the agreement to the patient until after emer-
gency care has been completed.
The severity of the injury may determine whether a patient is receiv-
ing emergency care. In Popper v. DiMusto,107 the plaintiff signed the
agreement upon admission to the hospital during which she com-
plained of uterine bleeding and abdominal pain. 0 8 The court held that
whether she was a person receiving emergency health care under the
Michigan statute'0 9 was a question of fact which would invalidate the
agreement if substantiated."l 0
D. Statutory Voidability and Revocation
In an attempt to promote strict compliance with statutory provisions,
two states specify limited conditions which void an otherwise valid ar-
bitration agreement. Both the Alaska' and Illinois" 2 statutes void an
agreement that does not provide clearly and in bold print that the pa-
tient's election is not a prerequisite to receiving care or treatment. The
Illinois statute also grants an opportunity for the patient to void an
agreement.' 13 Upon discharge, a health care facility must give the pa-
tient or family a copy of the previously executed agreement. The pa-
tient at this time must either affirm or void the arbitration agreement.
105. Maine's statute reads: "No person receiving emergency treatment or care shall be offered
the option of an arbitration agreement until such emergency treatment or care is completed." ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(1)(A) (Supp. 1982).
106. Michigan's statute provides: "A person receiving emergency health care or treatment
may be offered the option to arbitrate but shall be offered the option after the emergency care or
treatment is completed." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5042(1) (Supp. 1982). For a copy of
Michigan's Arbitration Agreement, see infra Appendix C.
107. 88 Mich. App. 743, 279 N.W.2d 542 (1979).
108. Id at 744, 279 N.W.2d at 543.
109. See supra note 106.
110. 88 Mich. App. 743, 745-46, 279 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1979).
111. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(b) (Supp. 1982).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).




As in the bold print requirement, failure to offer the patient this oppor-
tunity voids the agreement ab initio.
After the parties have signed the arbitration agreement, many states
sanction reevaluation of the arbitration election through subsequent
revocation periods. The various state statutes offer differing require-
ments on who may revoke, and what time restrictions exist. In Califor-
nia, 114 Illinois, I"5 and South Dakota, 1 6 either the patient or health care
provider may revoke, while in five other states-Alaska," 7 Louisi-
ana,"" Maine,"19 Ohio,120 and Virginia12 '--only the patient may re-
voke once signed. Time constraints are also crucial in revocability. In
Alaska, 22 California,' 23 and Louisiana, 124 one may revoke within
thirty days after execution; in Michigan, 2 5 sixty days after either exe-
cution or discharge from a hospital. 126 South Dakota 127 has no time
constraints within which a patient must revoke, and in Ohio 2 8 one may
revoke at the termination of the doctor-patient relationship. Illinois
provides that either party may revoke, within sixty days of execution,
discharge from a hospital, or after the last treatment for nonhospitaliza-
tion care. 12  Illinois also allows the representative of a decedent who
signed an agreement to revoke it within sixty days of appointment as
estate representative.
130
Alaska' 3 ' and Virginia 132 have contingency clauses which provide
extra flexibility in the event that death, insanity, or age prevents a party
from revoking the agreement. Under the Virginia statute, a legal repre-
114. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(c) (Deering 1981).
115. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
116. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(c) (Supp. 1982).
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4235 (West Supp. 1982).
119. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(1)(C) (Supp. 1982).
120. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B) (Page 1981).
121. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12(A) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
122. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(c) (Supp. 1982).
123. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(c) (Deering 1981).
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4235 (West Supp. 1982).
125. MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5041(3) (Supp. 1982).
126. Id at § 600.5042(3).
127. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979).
128. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B) (Page 1981).
129. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
130. Id
131. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(c) (Supp. 1981).
132. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12(A) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
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sentative of a deceased or incapacitated person may revoke within sixty
days after appointment. The Alaska statute similarly tolls the revoca-
tion period for physical incapacities. Michigan has no such incapacity
provision. In Capman v. Harper-Grace Hospital,133 the court refused to
allow plaintiff to revoke the agreement within sixty days of discovering
the alleged malpractice but more than sixty days after her discharge
from the hospital. The court reasoned that the statute does not pre-
clude her claim, as does a time-barred statute of limitation period.'
34
E. Arbitration Panels
The selection, composition, and size of arbitration panels varies
widely among the states. Alabama, 35 Georgia, 36 Illinois, 137 Louisi-
ana, 38 and Maine 39 utilize the most common method, in which claim-
ant and respondent each select one arbitrator, and these two arbitrators
then select a third. The Alaska procedure differs in that the parties
select the third arbitrator. 140 In most of these states, the statutes do not
specify the professional status of the arbitrators. Only Louisiana speci-
fies that the third arbitrator must be an attorney. ' 4 t To facilitate the
process, in four of these states142 the parties may petition the court to
assist them in their selection if unable to agree upon the third arbitra-
tor. Similarly, in Ohio143 each party selects an arbitrator and the court
selects the third as chairman.
In contrast, Michigan, 44 Puerto Rico, 
14  Virginia, 46 Vermont, 1 7
133. 96 Mich. App. 510, 294 N.W.2d 205 (1980).
134. fd at 516, 294 N.W.2d at 208. The court distinguished Amwake v. Mercy-Memorial
Hosp., 92 Mich. App. 546, 285 N.W.2d 369 (1979), in which the court held that a transfer of a
comatose patient to another hospital did not constitute a discharge within the statute to begin the
running of the 60-day period and that the timely filing of a complaint in court impliedly revoked
the arbitration agreement on the sixtieth day. 96 Mich. App. at 517, 294 N.W.2d at 208.
135. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (1975).
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-408(a) (Supp. 1982).
137. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 213(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (West Supp. 1982).
139. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2705(1) (Supp. 1982).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(0 (Supp. 1982).
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4233 (West Supp. 1982).
142. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(0 (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. § 7-408(b) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 213(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
143. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(A) (Page 1981).
144. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5044(2) (Supp. 1982).
145. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 4111(2) (Supp. 1980).




and South Dakota 4 specify the professional status of each arbitrator.
Michigan allows each party to select one arbitrator and mutually agree
upon a third. The panel must consist of an attorney, a physician, and a
layperson. The statute states a preference for a physician in the party-
physician's specialty, and also precludes the layperson from being a
physician in the disputed specialty, a lawyer, a hospital employee, or an
insurance company employee. 49 Puerto Rico provides for similar
panel composition, except that under mandatory arbitration, the Secre-
tary of Health appoints the panel. 150
In Virginia, the chief justice of the state supreme court selects the
panel. Three physicians, three attorneys, and one judge of the circuit
court, to act as chairman, constitute the Virginia panel.' 5 ' In Vermont,
the court selects a judicial referee and the parties select the professional
and lay members by lot, subject to challenges for cause and three pre-
emptory challenges.'52
In South Dakota, the amount of damages requested determines the
size of the panel. For a requested award of less than $10,000, each
party selects a panel member from lists of approved medical, legal, and
hospital professionals created by the state medical association, bar as-
sociation, and hospital association, respectively.' 53 If the requested
damages exceed $10,000, each party selects two panelists in a similar
manner. 154 In Maine'55 and Michigan, 56 the American Arbitration
Association provides a list of potential arbitrators from which the par-
ties select the three panel members. Only California does not regulate
panel composition or selection.
147. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp. 1982).
148. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-4 (1979).
149, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(2) (Supp. 1982).
150. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 4111(3) (Supp. 1980).
151, VA. CODE § 8.01-581.3 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
152. yr. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(c) (Supp. 1982).
153. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-13 (1979).
154. Id at § 21-25B-14.
155. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2705(2) (Supp. 1982).
156, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(3) (Supp. 1982).
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III. THE ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVE: THE PATIENT'S PERSPECTIVE
A4. Contractual Defects
Prior to ordering arbitration, a court must determine the validity1
57
and enforceability of the arbitration agreement using traditional con-
tract law standards. In the malpractice arbitration context, the courts
primarily focus on the voluntariness of the patient's election to arbi-
trate, the unconscionability of the contract, and whether the patient
made an informed and knowledgeable waiver. The courts also con-
sider the arbitrable nature of the patient's claim.'
5 8
An arbitration agreement may lack the mutual assent necessary for a
valid and enforceable contract. 159 The special relationship between a
patient and the health care provider, especially a physician, 60 may viti-
ate the element of free choice essential to the patient's election. The
layperson's ignorance of medical terminology, diagnoses, and treat-
ment forces the patient seeking medical services to depend on the doc-
tor's judgment. 61 Wishing to have faith in the ability of the physician
to relieve an ailment, a patient only reluctantly refuses the options
profferred by the health care professional. Because of the patient's pos-
sible inability to properly assess these options, mutual assent may not
exist.
The patient's relatively weak bargaining position may make an arbi-
tration agreement a contract of adhesion. 162 Generally, the hospital
63
157. Maine's statute presumes that an agreement to arbitrate is valid, but a court may stay
arbitration as provided by law or court rule. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2701(2) (Supp. 1982).
158. Miller v. Swanson, 95 Mich. App. 36, 289 N.W.2d 875 (1980), adopted a three-part test to
determine whether a dispute is arbitrable: "(1) Is there an arbitration agreement in a contract
between the parties? (2) Is the insured's claim 'on its face' or 'arguably' related to the contract? and
(3) Is the dispute 'expressly exempt' by the terms of the contract?" Id at 39, 289 N.W.2d at 877
(citing American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Barry, 80 Mich. App. 670, 264 N.W.2d 92 (1978)).
159. The Restatement emphasizes the importance of knowledge of the terms of the bargain to
manifest mutual assent: "(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the
parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and (a) neither party knows or
has reason to know the meaning attached by the other .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CON-
TRACTS § 20 (1981). See also 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 82, at § 107.
160. As one court noted: "Doctors are held in high esteem and admiration by the public. The
average person is not disposed to question or doubt a doctor's treatment." Miner v. Walden, 101
Misc. 2d 814, 818, 422 N.Y.S. 335, 338 (1979).
161. See Comment, supra note I, at 325. One commentator criticized offering the agreement
in advance of the claim as unfair because of the patient's dependence on the doctor and inability
to appreciate the significance of his actions at a time of medical need. ARBITRATION: COMMER-
CIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS, supra note 60, at 334.
162. "In dealing with standardized contracts courts have to determine what the weaker con-
[Vol. 61:123
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss1/2
Number 1] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
or medical provider offers the patient a standardized, preprinted agree-
ment. Because the patient frequently is not in a position to shop
around for another health care provider,' 64 the terms of the standard-
ized form agreement become adhesive. This disparity of bargaining
power combined with the patient's possibly deficient understanding of
the contract terms may vitiate the voluntariness of the contract.
65
The exigencies of a patient's physical or mental distress may likewise
interfere with a voluntary and rational election of arbitration. In
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 66 the court held that a hospital's "Con-
ditions of Admission" form constituted a contract of adhesion because
the patient had no realistic opportunity to elect arbitration. 167 To reject
the arbitration election, the admissions form required the patient to ini-
tial a paragraph entitled "Arbitration Option." Thus, the admissions
form imposed arbitration unless the patient repudiated the option upon
admission. Plaintiff alleged that the hospital personnel neither called
attention to this clause, nor provided the patient with a copy of the
form to peruse at a later time.' 68  The court held that the hospital's
failure to give a reasonable explanation of the option rendered the
tracting party could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's 'calling,'
and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical
life situation." Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1943). See also Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d
753 (2d Cir. 1967) (no contract of adhesion because parties of equal bargaining strength). Com-
pare Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (doubts
regarding insurance coverage resolved against insurer, who is stronger bargainer) with Kukowski
v. Piskin, 99 Mich. App. 1,297 N.W.2d 612 (1980) (doubts about arbitrability resolved in favor of
physician due to strong public policy favoring arbitration).
163. Michigan requires hospitals to offer the arbitration option in order to receive insurance.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, § 500.3053 (Supp. 1982).
164. See Kessler, supra note 162, at 632. Seealso Miner v. Walden, 101 Misc. 2d 814, 818, 422
N.Y.S. 335, 338 (1979). If the patient is not made aware of the consequences of choosing arbitra-
tion, such that his assent is manifested by a reflexive signature while he signs other consent and
insurance forms, then the voluntariness of this election is rendered nugatory. See supra note 161
and accompanying text.
165. See Henderson, supra note 13, at 969; Kessler, supra note 162, at 632.
166. 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976).
167. The court reasoned that:
[rio the ordinary person, admission to a hospital is an anxious, stressful, and frequently a
traumatic experience. . . .the hospital can hardly expect the patient to read the printed
conditions on an admission form, much less understand the meaning of a broad arbitra-
tion clause. . . .the patient normally feels he has no choice but to seek admission. ..
and to acceed to all of the terms. . ..
Id at 360, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
168. Id at 351, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
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agreement void as a contract of adhesion because an arbitration clause
is not within the reasonable expectations of a person seeking admission
to a hospital.
69
Given this potentially superior bargaining position, courts closely
scrutinize agreements presented by medical facilities. In Tunkl v. Re-
gents of University of Calfornia,'70 the hospital's admission form excul-
pated the hospital from liability for negligent or wrongful acts.' 7' The
court held that the agreement constituted a contract of adhesion 7 2 and
was contrary to public policy. 173 The court reasoned that "the patient,
as the price of admission and as a result of his inferior bargaining posi-
tion . . . subjected himself to control of the hospital and the possible
infliction of negligence which he had thus been compelled to waive." 174
Similarly, in Miner v. Walden, 75 a New York court held that an arbi-
tration agreement signed in a doctor's office as a condition to treat-
ment 176  constituted an unconscionable adhesion contract.' 77  In
169. The court reasoned that the patient may expect that the admissions form will obligate
him to abide by hospital rules and regulations, but "would hardly expect his signature to ... give
the hospital as well as 'any doctor' the option to compel arbitration of a malpractice claim." Id at
360-61, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
170. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
171. Id at 94, 383 P.2d at 442, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
172. The court reasoned that "[t]he would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered
agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital. The
admission room of a hospital contains no bargaining table. ... Id at 102, 383 P.2d at 447, 32
Cal. Rptr. at 39.
173. The court held that the hospital, as a business affected with a public interest and whose
services are of great importance to the public, may not exculpate itself from liability and shift the
entire risk to the patient who demands its services. Id at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr.
at 37-38.
174. Id at 102, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
175. 101 Misc. 2d 814, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1979).
176. The court reasoned that the patient, in an inferior bargaining position, could not receive
services unless he signed the required agreement. Id at 816, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 337. See also Hen-
derson, supra note 13, at 993-97.
177. 101 Misc.2d at 818, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 338. Seealso Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Judge Wright's classic explication of unconscionability
takes the following factors into consideration: 1) absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties, 2) terms which unreasonably favor one party, 3) no opportunity to understand terms
due to lack of education, and 4) party in weaker bargaining position has limited understanding of
terms. Id.
In addition to the potential disparity in bargaining power, an agreement may be deficient for
lack of consideration. The court in Miner held that an arbitration clause was unenforceable be-
cause the agreement was not mutually binding. In return for the patient's consent to arbitrate
possible claims, the doctor agreed to arbitrate all claims except for disputes over fees, the only
possible claim a doctor could have. 101 Misc.2d 814, 819-20, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1979).
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deciding the unconscionability question, the court specifically noted the
gross inequality of bargaining power between the parties.
17
In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,179 the disparity of bar-
gaining power did not exist when the State Employees Retirement Sys-
tem contracted for a group health plan which provided for arbitration.
Plaintiff, a state employee, challenged the authority of the System's
Board to bind her claim to arbitration, 80 and further asserted that the
plan constituted an adhesion contract. Plaintiff based her latter claim
on the grounds that the inconspicuous and unexpected clause disrupted
the employee's reasonable expectation that a jury would adjudicate a
malpractice claim.'"' The court rejected plaintiff's claims, following
Doyle v. Giuliucci,8 2 and analogized the authority of an agent to that of
a parent, who may enter into such a contract on behalf of a child.'8 3
Similarly, the court rejected the adhesion argument, reasoning that
Kaiser and the Board possessed "parity of bargaining strength" 84 and
that plaintiff had the opportunity to select from among several medical
plans that did not include arbitration.'
Courts, however, continue to scrutinize group health care policies.
In Benyon v. Garden Grove Medical Group,1 6 plaintiff obtained medical
coverage as part of a group health care plan through her employer.
Provisions within the master policy gave the medical provider the right
to reject an arbitration decision without cause and to resubmit the dis-
pute before an arbitration panel composed solely of physicians. 8 7 Re-
lying on Madden' 8 and *heeler,' 8 9 the Benyon court held that the
master policy constituted a contract of adhesion because no agency in
parity with the medical group bargained on behalf of the employee
178. 101 Misc. 2d at 818, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
179. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
180. Id at 702, 552 P.2d at 1180, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
181. Id at 710, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
182. 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965). See also supra notes 83-86 and
accompanying text.
183. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 709, 552 P.2d 1778, 1184, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 888.
184. Id at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
185. Id at 711, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
186. 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1980).
187. Id at 702, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
188. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976). See supra notes 179-85 and
accompanying text.
189. 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976). See supra notes 166-69 and accompany-
ing text.
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group. 90 The court emphasized the employee's lack of awareness of
the arbitration terms, because the provisions were "especially disadvan-
tageous" to the beneficiary-employee.' 91
Provisions for voluntary election and revocation of arbitration under
state statutes affect judicial scrutiny of these agreements as contracts of
adhesion. In Brown v. Siang,192 a Michigan court rejected the argu-
ment that the standardized form of the agreement always constitutes an
adhesion contract because of the health care provider's bargaining ad-
vantage. 93 In upholding the agreement, the Brown court considered
three factors: the health care provider may not require the agreement
as a prerequisite to health care;' 94 the patient may revoke at any time
within the statutorily required sixty-day revocation period;195and the
patient may make a realistic choice based on the information booklet
which accompanies the form.
196
The validity of the Brown court's considerations depends on the pa-
tient's ability to understand the terms contained in an arbitration agree-
ment, and the consequences of electing arbitration. Explanations by
hospital personnel, 197 boldface provisions,198 and information
brochures'99 are meaningless unless the patient understands the terms
"arbitration" and "revocation." Courts may attribute too much legal
acumen 2°° to the average patient. The possible unfamiliarity of the
190. 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705-06, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150-51 (1980).
19 1. The court relied on Madden in requiring actual knowledge on the part of the beneficiary
if arbitration were an "extraordinary procedure" and one "especially disadvantageous" for the
beneficiary. Id at 708, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 151. See also Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal.
3d 699, 709 n.11; 552 P.2d 1178, 1184, n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 888 n.1l (1976).
192. 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981).
193. Id at 108, 309 N.W.2d at 582.
194. Id
195. Id
196. Id The Michigan statute requires that the proffering of the agreement "shall be accom-
panied by an information brochure which clearly details the agreement and revocation provision."
MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5041(6) (Supp. 1982). Maine has a similar provision. See ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(D) (Supp. 1982).
197. The court in Wheeler imposed procedural requirements on the hospital to better inform
the patient: "The hospital's admission clerk need only direct the patient's attention to the arbitra-
tion provision, request him to read it, and give him a simple explanation of its purpose and effect,
including available options." 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 361, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (1976).
198. To the extent that one does not understand the terms of the agreement, requiring the
same to be printed in bold letters is like yelling at a deaf man. The patient has no greater compre-
hension of the significance of the terms because they are printed larger.
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
200. The Madden court argued that persons selecting arbitration understood what they surren-
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health care setting and the anxiety of seeking medical care creates an
inappropriate atmosphere for explaining the legal consequences of
electing arbitration. 20  A patient may not reasonably contemplate mal-
practice at such a time, let alone arbitrating such a claim.20 2
Disclosure of the legal consequences of the arbitration option also
plays a part in determining whether the patient knowledgeably entered
into the agreement. The health care provider should reveal all factors
that might influence the patient's decision.20 3  It is not enough to in-
form a patient that due to the recent medical malpractice crisis2° legis-
latures2 5 have created an alternative forum for settling malpractice
claims. The patient should know prior to election that arbitration may
be as inefficient as litigation,20" and has resulted in fewer and lower
awards for plaintiffs.20 7
dered. "When parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration they select a forum . . . in
which, as they well know, disputes are not resolved by juries." 17 Cal. 3d at 714,552 P.2d at 1187,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
The Patient Information Booklet supplied to the patient when offering arbitration under Michi-
gan's statute defines "'Arbitration" as "a substitute for going to court to settle disputes. It is a
procedure by which disputing parties have a three-person panel of arbitrators, rather than a judge
or jury, hear and make a final decision about the disagreement." PATIENT INFORMATION BOOK-
LET 1 (1976). This booklet is prepared by the Michigan Arbitration Advisory Committee, an 18-
member group composed of health leaders, lawyers, insurance representatives and nine lay mem-
bers, and is approved by the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance. See also Comment, supra
note 1. at 325-26.
Printed at the top of the agreement, see infra Appendix C, is the message "This form is ap-
proved by the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance," set off in a box to attract the reader's atten-
ton. It is conceivable that a patient viewing this at the time of the offering will either infer that
this is another insurance form which requires signature or that the agreement should be signed
because it is approved by an authoritative government official.
201. One commentator suggested that inequality of bargaining power can result from incom-
plete knowledge: "[A]n extreme disproportion in values in a bargain transaction requires explana-
tion, and the explanation can usually be found in some misplaced reliance on the opposite party's
good faith, some misleading partial disclosure, or some extreme inequality of the parties in knowl-
edge, experience, or economic resources." Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45
MicH. L. REV. 253, 281 (1947).
202. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 360, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (1976).
See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
203. As one commentator noted: "It is clear from the overwhelming 'acceptance' of the arbi-
tral provisions embodied in the current treatment agreements that the public has not yet discov-
ered what the fine print means." HEW APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 298.
204. See supra notes 1-5 & 23-35 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. For a complete list of states that have
-reated arbitration statutes, see supra notes 11 & 14 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 252-67 and accompanying text.
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Informed consent in the medical setting provides a comparable stan-
dard. Informed consent is crucial to the practice of medicine because it
prevents an unlawful touching or battery action against a physician.
208
In Canterbury v. Spence,2 °9 the court held that a physician has a duty to
disclose to the patient not only the proposed therapy but the potential
and inherent dangers involved in the treatment. 210 Disclosure must en-
compass all material risks that may affect the patient's decision.2 "
True consent, the court reasoned, involves making a choice, which de-
mands the "opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options avail-
able and the risks attendant upon each. 21 2
In applying the doctrine of informed consent to arbitration, the pa-
tient should know the risks, alternatives, and disadvantages of choosing
arbitration. Any lower standard renders the assent involuntary, or at
best, ill informed. The similarity between selecting the arbitration op-
tion and a medical procedure makes the Canterbury test of consent par-
ticularly applicable. Both depend upon the availability and
communication of risk information essential to an informed decision,
thereby respecting the patient's right to self determination.2 3
208. See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 22.08. For excellent reviews of
cases applying informed consent in the medical field, see generally Hagman, The Medical Patient's
Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 758
(1970); Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintifs Medical Mapractice "Wonder Drug," 31 Mo. L.
REv. 29 (1966); Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, II CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 249
(1962); Plante, An Analysis ofInformed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968).
The Secretary's (HEW) Commission on Medical Malpractice criticized informed consent as
placing an unfair burden on the doctor. Even if a patient consents, the physician may be liable if
the patient can prove that the physician inadequately informed him of the risks associated with
the procedure. HEW REPORT, supra note I, at 29.
209. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
210. Id at 782.
211. "A risk is ... material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should
know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of
risks in deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy." Waltz & Scheuneman, In-
formed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 640 (1970).
Courts apply an objective test in establishing consent: "whether a reasonable man would con-
clude from the patient's behavior that he was aware of the risk and that he manifested a willing-
ness to encounter it." Id at 645.
212. 464 F.2d at 790. The patient's consent must be informed because "uninformed consent is
really no consent at all." Note, supra note 2, at 94.
213. 464 F.2d at 784. The court based its reasoning of the informed consent doctrine on the
"root premise" that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body." Id at 780 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
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B. Constitutional Considerations. Due Process and Panel Bias
The composition of an arbitration panel may violate the patient's
due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal."u 4 Although panel
composition varies widely among the states, the arbitration statutes
commonly provide for a three-member panel composed of a physician
or hospital administrator, an attorney, and a layperson.2" 5 The physi-
cian's presence on the panel raises potential due process considerations.
An impartial decisionmaker can have neither a pecuniary2 6 nor a
financially related professional interest t' in the outcome. A physician
may have a significant pecuniary interest in an arbitration proceeding.
A large award may affect the availability of insurance and increase the
panelist's own malpractice rates. In an effort to reduce competition, or
out of a feeling of professional responsibility, a physician may be
tempted to punish his fellow medical practitioners. It is more likely,
however, that a physician will empathize with a fellow doctor. This
empathy, combined with the physician-panelist's own pecuniary inter-
est in keeping insurance rates low, creates a tremendous disincentive to
find fault or to make a large damage award, even if justified. Thus, the
presence of the physician may violate the patient's due process rights.
In Michigan, lower appellate court panels have split on this question.
In Jackson v. Detroit Memorial Hospital,218 one panel held the state's
malpractice arbitration statute unconstitutional because it included a
physician on the panel. Although Michigan's statute contained a pro-
vision requiring that the American Arbitration Association screen all
potential panel members,219 the court found that the likelihood of phy-
214. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1965). See also infra Appendix E.
215. See supra notes 135-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of states that follow this
pattern.
216. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor may not sit as judge in
traffic court where large part of village income derived from fees and fines); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927) (mayor may not receive costs assessed against convicted defendants as compensa-
tion for acting as judge).
217. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (Optometric Board composed of optome-
trists in private practice may not revoke licenses of optometrists in business practice due to poten-
tial pecuniary gain); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1969) (neutral third arbitrator's services utilized by one party prior to arbitration proceedings).
218. 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212 (1981).
219. In both Michigan and Maine, the American Arbitration Association actively aids the
parties in selecting a panel. In those two states the panel consists of an attorney, a physician,
preferably but not necessarily from the defendant's specialty, and a layman who is not a represen-
tative of the medical, hospital, or insurance fields. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5044(2) (Supp.
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sician bias was too high to be constitutionally permissible.220 The court
based its findings on the pecuniary relationship between the size of
malpractice awards and insurance premiums.
22' In Brown v. Siang,222
however, another panel held that a nexus between damage awards and
insurance premiums was too remote223 reasoning that the safeguards
within the statute ensured the impartiality of the physician panel-
member.224
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2705(1) (Supp. 1982). In contrast to the common method of
selection, whereby each party selects an arbitrator, and the two arbitrators pick a third, the parties
in Maine and Michigan combine their ranked preferences in each of the three categories to create
the panel. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(3) (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2705(1) (Supp. 1982).
220. 110 Mich. App. at 204, 312 N.W.2d at 213.
221. Murray v. Wilner, No. 50386 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21, 1982). In Murray, the court held
that the potential pecuniary bias threatened a physician's impartiality.
The threat from the interrelations between awards and the cost of insurance is that it
may contribute to a subtle systematic bias in arbitrators chosen from the medical profes-
sion. It is a relationship that offers a possible temptation to the average man as a deci-
sionmaker to forget the requisite burden of proof, and which might lead to a
decisionmaker to fail to hold the balance between the parties nice, clear, and true.
Id at 8-9. See also supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
222. 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981).
223. Id at 104, 309 N.W.2d at 580.
224. Id The appeals court panel in Cushman v. Frankel, 111 Mich. App. 604, 314 N.W.2d
705 (1981), cited several statutory procedures to reduce the possibility of bias among panel
members:
(1) arbitration association conducts an initial screening of potential candidates for po-
tential bias;
(2) each panel candidate must complete a personal disclosure statement under oath;
(3) the parties will receive any information as to partiality;
(4) the parties may also submit voir dire questions to a candidate within 10 days after
receiving a candidate's name;
(5) the parties may strike an unaccpetable candidate from the suggested list;
(6) panel members appointed by the association are subject to challenge for cause.
Id at 610, 314 N.W.2d at 708.
In a vehement response to the majority's opinion in Williams v. O'Connor, 108 Mich. App. 613,
310 N.W.2d 825 (1981), the dissent argued that the failure of the arbitration agreement to indicate
the composition of the panel vitiates any attempt to secure a patient's voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent election of the arbitration option. Id at 623, 310 N.W.2d at 829 (Burns, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the dissent noted that a physician's bias may reach beyond pecuniary concerns: "mem-
bers of the medical profession are not likely to have neutral feelings on the topic of medical
malpractice claims as is evident by the reluctance of physicians to testify in medical malpractice
actions." Id
For other decisions among the Michigan court of appeals which have upheld the constitutional-
ity of a physician on the arbitration panel, see Gale v. Providence Hosp., No. 53097 (Mich. Ct.
App. July 21, 1982); Rome v. Sinai Hosp., 112 Mich. App. 387, 316 N.W.2d 428 (1982); Cushman
v. Frankel, 111 Mich. App. 604, 314 N.W.2d 705 (1981); Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App.
110, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981). But see Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., No. 52690 (Mich. Ct. App.
July 21, 1982); Malek v. Jayakar, No. 44356, 45563 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 1982).
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A previous employment relationship with one of the parties may also
demonstrate bias. In Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital,2 25 a California
court overturned an arbitration award because the physician-panelist
failed to disclose that he had rendered services on behalf of the defend-
ant's law firm after his appointment to the panel.226
IV. THE PATIENT'S BEST INTERESTS: EVALUATION AND REFORM
A. The Effectiveness of Arbitration.- Case Studies
Through arbitration, legislatures hoped to reduce the delays and
costs associated with litigation.227 They also believed that a panel com-
posed of professionals would have a greater understanding of medical
terminology and procedures, would be less subject to emotional ap-
peals than juries,211 and would render more rational awards. The goals
of arbitration, although laudatory from the viewpoint of the medical
and insurance professions, may harm the interests of health care
recipients.
One of the most comprehensive studies of arbitration programs de-
veloped from the Southern California Arbitration Project, designed in
cooperation with the California Hospital Association and the Califor-
nia Medical Association.229 Between 1966 and 1975, eight hospitals in
the Los Angeles area agreed to offer patients voluntary, binding arbi-
tration agreements that allowed for a thirty day revocation period.
230
The study targeted an additional group of hospitals as a control group
which resolved disputes through litigation.
The data revealed that between 1966 and 1975 the arbitration and
control groups closed approximately the same percentage of claims.23'
The data showed that arbitration resolved the average claim in approx-
225. 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976).
226. Id at 370, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
227. See supra notes 7 & 13 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
229. See Heintz Medical Malpractice Arbitratiorn .4 Viable Alternative, 34 ARB. J. 12 (Dec.
1979) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Study]. For an evaluation of this study through 1975, see
Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is it Cost Effective, 36 MD. L. REv. 533
(1977).
230. Arbitration Study. supra note 229, at 13.
231. Id at 15. Of the claims filed from 1966 to 1969, as of June 30, 1978, 98.14% and 97.58%
were closed for arbitration and control groups, respectively. Of the claims filed between 1970 and
1975, the arbitration group closed 78.92%, the control group closed 78.05%. Id
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
154 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
imately three months shorter time than litigation.232 Arbitration settled
the greatest percentage of claims in twelve to twenty-four months,233
compared to twenty-four to thirty-six months for litigation.234
Both forms of dispute resolution gave a virtually identical percentage
of awards under $15,000.235 Both groups closed 50% of the claims
without any payment,236 although the arbitration group experienced
nearly a 60% savings in defense costs. 237 The largest percentage of
awards for both groups was between $1000 and $5 000.238 The greatest
differential in awards arose in claims for over $40,000. Under arbitra-
tion, 1.5% of all claims received over $40,000; under litigation, 3.7%.239
In addition, only 1% of the 500,000 patients opted to revoke the con-
tract for arbitration within the thirty-day revocation period.240 Thus,
the data from this study reveal that arbitration may slightly decrease
the time in the resolution of disputes, lower defense costs, and produce
damage awards nearly equal to jury awards, except for claims worth
more than $40,000.
Michigan was the first state to adopt a medical malpractice arbitra-
tion statutory program statewide.241 Since the start of the program in
January 1976, 323 patients have filed claims for arbitration.242 As of
December 1981, 50%, or 173 claims, remain pending.243 Of the 150
closed claims, patients withdrew 24.7% prior to submission and settled
53.3%.244 Twenty-two percent resulted in an award to the claimant.
Settlements ranged from $300 to $220,000, with a mean of $20,000.241
232. Between 1970 and 1975, the arbitration group resolved the average claim in 31.22
months; the control group in 33.5 months. Id at 16.
233. The arbitration group, between 1970 and 1975, closed 26.79% of all claims within 12 to 23
months. Id
234. The control group, between 1970 and 1975, closed only 17.9% of claims within 12 to 23
months, but closed 23.36% of all claims within 24 to 35 months. Id
235. Id at 17.
236. Id
237. Id at 18. Defense costs were 58.93% less in arbitration than in litigation.
238. See id at 17 table 2.
239. Id
240. Id at 13. The author noted that some of these agreements proved unenforceable because
of inappropriate execution. Id
241. See Schoonmaker, The Medical Malpractice Arbitration Program in Michigan, 642 INS.
L.J. 370, 370 (June 1977).
242. MICHIGAN DEP'T OF LICENSING AND REGULATION, MICHIGAN ARBITRATION PROGRAM:
SUMMARY CASE STATISTICS 1 (Dec. 31, 1981).
243. Id Seventy-four of the 76 claims filed in 1981 were still pending as of December 31, 1981.
244. Id




Of the thirty-three claims resolved through arbitration, the patient pre-
vailed in only eight cases.246 The awards ranged from $250 to $20,100,
with a mean of about $9200, a figure substantially below the average
settlement.247
From this limited data, arbitration apparently resolves malpractice
claims more expeditiously and less expensively than litigation. Arbi-
tration hearings averaged two days in length, with administrative
coStS248 and expenses averaging about $1470. This figure does not in-
clude the cost of the six-month discovery period or attorney case prepa-
ration.249 On the average, 340 days elapsed from the filing of the claim
to the award, excluding the discovery and thirty day award periods.
Thus, under the Michigan plan, it takes nearly a year to receive an
average award of about $9000, a figure that resembles the average
award under the California project. 1
B. Suggested Reforms
It is difficult to accurately predict from this preliminary data whether
arbitration results in more expeditious and equitable awards for pa-
tients. Data suggest that arbitration provides a shorter time from the
filing of a claim to the eventual award, although the savings is not sub-
stantial. 252 Congested court dockets demand that patients be en-
couraged to follow an alternative to litigation. By following the
alternative, patients should not, however, forfeit their rights. Patients
should decide whether arbitration is more advantageous for their situa-
tion. Because the decision is binding and subject to limited judicial
review, the health care provider should fully inform patients of the con-
sequences of their actions.
To ensure that the patient's consent is truly informed and voluntary,
the health care provider should not offer the arbitration option prior to
the claim. 253 The anxieties present in unfamiliar surroundings, and the
potential inability of the medical personnel to adequately explain the
246. Id at 1.
247. Id at 2.
248. Id
249, Id at 1.
250. Id
251. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. The average claim under the California plan
ranged between $1000 and $5000.
252. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 115-35 and accompanying text.
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arbitration option, may nullify or interfere with the voluntariness of the
election. The patient's physical or mental condition may inappropri-
ately affect the decision to agree to arbitrate, although the patient's
election appears voluntary.
Similarly, a patient may regret selecting the option prior to the mani-
festation of subsequent injuries. The statutory period for revocation254
becomes virtually meaningless if the patient lacked information and
believed that his signature was required on the form. Upon completion
of treatment, the average patient is not likely to spend the next thirty or
sixty days deliberating whether or not to revoke.
Requiring that the agreement be presented after the claim has arisen,
with an attorney present, is one solution to help ensure that the patient
intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily agreed to arbitration.255 Al-
though this suggestion may seem burdensome, an attorney is more
likely to be informed of the legal consequences of the election than
medical personnel. The attorney could discuss with the patient the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of arbitration, perhaps by utilizing avail-
able data collected for this purpose. The health care provider should
fully inform the patient about the risks and benefits associated with
choosing arbitration. Anything less constitutes an inequitable depriva-
tion of valuable patient rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to combat the medical malpractice crisis and pacify the
discontent in the health care profession, many states adopted arbitra-
tion statutes to provide an alternative forum for malpractice disputes.
These statutes, however, deprive patients of valuable rights by prescrib-
ing inequitable procedures associated with the election of arbitration
and resolution of their claims. Whether arbitration is ultimately in the
patient's best interests is still unclear, and perhaps more data will pro-
vide the answer. Nevertheless, legislatures must ensure that arbitration
is in the best interests not only of the medical profession, but of society
as a whole.
Jacqueline R. Baum
254. See supra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.














aALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(b) (Supp. 1982).
bCALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (Deering 1982).
CILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
dME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(1)(B) (Supp. 1982).
eMICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5041(5) (Supp. 1982).
fOHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.24 (Page 1981).
sS.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-3 (1979).
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APPENDIX Ba
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS COVERED BY
ARBITRATION
€4-
OrzS 0 0 0 0- 0 ,..
Chiropractor X X X X X
Clinic X X X X X X
Dentist X X X X X X
Doctor X X X XX X X X X X
Health Dispensary X
Health Facility X
HMO X X X X X
Hospital X X X X X X X
Legal Rep. X X X
Nurse X X X
Nursing Home X X X
Optometrist X X X X
Osteopath X X X
Pharmacist X X X
Phys. Therapist X X X




"Health Care Prov" X X X
aThis chart based on an earlier survey by Ladimer, Statutory Proyvisionsfor Binding Arbitration of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 1976 INS. L.J. 405,409.
bAh. CODE § 6-5-481 (1977).
cALASKa STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1981).
dCALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(g)(1) (Deering 1981).
cGA. CODE ANN. § 7-401 (Supp. 1982).
fILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 202(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
gLA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230(1) (West Supp. 1982).
hMn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2701(1) (Supp. 1982).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5040(2)(b) (Supp. 1982).
JOHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.22 (Page 1981).
kS.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979).
'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (Supp. 1982).
mVA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
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APPENDIX C
This form is approved by the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
HOSPITAL IN-PATIENT, OUT-PATIENT SURGERY AND EMERGENCY ROOM FORM
I understand that this hospital and I by signing this document agree to arbitrate any claims or
disputes (except for disputes over charges for services rendered) which may arise in the future out
of or in connection with the health care rendered to me during this hospital stay and/or emer-
gency room visit by this hospital, its employees and those of its independent staff doctors and
consultants who have agreed to arbitrate.
I understand that Michigan Law gives me the choice of trial by judge or jury or of arbitration. I
understand that arbitration is a procedure by which a panel that is either mutually agreed upon or
appointed decides the dispute rather than a judge orjury. I freely choose arbitration, and I agree
that a judgment of any circuit court may be rendered upon any award or determination made
pursuant to this agreement. I also understand that any arbitration will be conducted in accord-
ance with Michigan Law and the Michigan Medical Arbitration Rules, as approved by the Com-
missioner of Insurance.
I understand that this agreement to arbitrate is binding on me and all my agents, representatives
and heirs and assigns, as well as on this hospital, its employees and those of its independent staff
doctors, and consultants who have agreed to arbitrate.
I certify that I have read this agreement or have had it read to me and that I fully understand its
content and execute this agreement of my own free will. I have received a complete copy of the
booklet which explains this agreement.
THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO HEALTH CARE
OR TREATMENT AND MAY BE REVOKED WITHIN 60 DAYS AFTER DISCHARGE BY
NOTIFICATION IN WRITING TO.
Signature of Hospital Representative Patient Name (Type or Print)
Address Patient Signature
Date Patient Address
(I certify that I am the parent of the minor
child, the guardian, or other legal
representative of the patient involved.)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE
Give Booklet with proposed agreement to patient; if Name of parent, legal guardian or other legal
agreement is signed, place duplicaie original in patient's representative (type or print)
file
Emergency Room Do not present for
patient signature until after emergency care has been Signature of parent, legal guardian or other legal
completed. representative
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
City National Bank Building - No. 1035 - Detroit, Michigan 48226 - Phone: (800) 486-0660
IBA 101
Approved 12/l/75
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aALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(c) (Supp. 1981).
bCALIF. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(c) (Deering 1981).
CILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
dLA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4233 (West Supp. 1982).
eME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2702(c) (Supp. 1982).
fMICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(3), 600.5042(3) (Supp. 1982).
50o REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B) (Page 1981).
hS.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979).












































aALA. CODE § 6-5485(b) (1977).
bALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(0 (Supp. 1981).
'Not Applicable
dGA. CODE ANN. § 7-408(a) (Supp. 1982).
CILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
1LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (West. Supp. 1982).
SME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2705 (Supp. 1982).
hMICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(2) (Supp. 1982).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(F) (Page 1981).
JP.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 4111 (Supp. 1980).
kS.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-4 (1979).
k2S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-13 (1979).
IVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp. 1982).
mVA. CODE § 8.01-581.3 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
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